Potential Risks
DISCLAIMER // NFA // DYOR
This analysis is based on observations of the contract behavior. We are not smart contract security experts. This document aims to explain what the contract appears to do based on the code. It should not be considered a comprehensive security audit or financial advice. Always verify critical information independently and consult with blockchain security professionals for important decisions.
⊙ generated by robots | curated by humans
| METADATA | |
|---|---|
| Contract Address | 0x643A45B5...0673C1 (etherscan) |
| Network | Ethereum Mainnet |
| Analysis Date | 2026-08-18 |
Overview
A risk assessment was conducted against the Majeur framework as part of the broader contract analysis. The assessment examined centralization characteristics, trust assumptions, economic vectors, complexity surface area, and external dependencies across the verified Solidity source — 2,110 lines covering five contracts, Moloch, Shares, Loot, Badges and Summoner — together with the shared renderer every clone depends on and two of the 56 live DAOs sampled as an empirical layer.
The framework is a non-upgradeable DAO governor deployed as Minimal Proxy clones from a fixed implementation. The implementation cannot be swapped and there is no pause. That removes the class of risk carried by an upgradeable governance stack, and equally removes the ability to patch: a defect in the implementation cannot be fixed for any DAO already running on it.
Because the trust surface is governance rather than administration, the assessment concentrated on what a passing proposal can reach, what survives a proposal without needing another one, and what a voter can actually know at the moment they vote. Those three questions account for most of the findings. The system's central design decision — that a proposal is a hash, and its meaning lives off-chain — is the source of several of them, and is described here in terms of what it makes observable and what it does not.
Every finding is against the implementation and therefore applies to every clone. Where one could be demonstrated against a sampled instance's real proposals, permits or storage rather than argued from the source alone, it was — those citations are evidence, not the finding.
Findings Summary
The assessment identified 18 findings across four severity tiers and five risk categories. No critical-severity issues were identified. Within the paths reviewed, no unauthenticated route to the treasury was found — each powerful capability appears reachable only through a passing vote, or through rights that a passing vote previously granted. Absence of a finding is not evidence that no such path exists. The findings concentrate on the durability of those grants, on the gap between what a voter approves and what the chain records, on configuration pairings that can strand proposals which met every stated pass condition, and on the difference between what the badge and quorum mechanics are described as doing and what they compute.
| SEVERITY | COUNT |
|---|---|
| Critical | 0 |
| High | 4 |
| Medium | 5 |
| Low | 5 |
| Informational | 4 |
| CATEGORY | FINDINGS |
|---|---|
| Complexity | 6 |
| Centralization | 4 |
| Trust Assumption | 4 |
| Economic | 3 |
| External Dependency | 1 |
Report Availability
The detailed findings for this assessment are not publicly available at this time. The full report includes specific descriptions of each finding, affected code paths, severity justification, and suggested questions for contract owners and integrators.
If you are the contract owner, an integrator, or a security researcher with a legitimate interest in the full findings, you are welcome to request this portion of the report (no guarantees).